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Abstract—In this paper we scrutinize the security properties 
of an RFID authentication protocol conforming to the EPC 
Class-1 Generation-2 standard. The protocol is suitable for Gen-
2 passive tags and requires simple computations. The authors 
claim that the scheme provides privacy protection and 
authentication and offers resistant against commonly assumed 
attacks. We propose a de-synchronization and an impersonation 
attack in which the disclosing of the secret information (i.e. secret 
key and static identifier) shared between the tag and the reader is 
unnecessary to success in these attacks.   
Keywords—  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a technology 
highly demanded in numerous applications and domains and 
therefore is under a continuous and rapid development [1-4]. 
Securing RFID tags against security threats is considered the 
main obstacle facing the widespread adoption of RFID 
technology [5-8], where hundreds of RFID protocols have been 
proposed and focused on providing a secure contact between 
readers and tags over the insecure radio channel. Nevertheless, 
due to the limitations of tags in terms of circuitry (gate 
equivalents), storage and power consumption, the design of an 
efficient and secure mutual authentication protocol presents an 
immense challenge.  It is even more challenging for low-cost 
technologies such as lightweight RFID security protocols in 
which tags possesses stronger limitations. Among the set of 
risks linked to RFID technology, privacy and de-
synchronization are the most challenging as the majority of 
designed protocols fail to offer protection against these two 
threats.  
 
Yeh et al.’s protocol [9] aims to secure EPC Class-1 
Generation-2 standard. Similar to many previously proposed 
protocols, it can be categorized under the class of lightweight 
mutual authentication protocol following the classification 
proposed in [10]. In this category, it is assumed that tags can 
generate a random number but they do not have the 
computational resources to support on-board  hash function. 
On the other hand and similar to other lightweight RFID 
authentication protocols, Yeh et al.’s scheme is designed with a 
new parameter representing a database index value. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows,   Section 2 
presents a short review of lightweight mutual authentication 
protocols .  After that, a full review of Yeh et al.’s protocol and 
its functionality is described in Section 3. Section 4 elaborates 
on the vulnerability analysis of the protocol and its 
assumptions.   A de-synchronization attack is proposed in Sub-
Section 4.1 and  an impersonation attack is presented in Sub-
Section4.2.  Finally,   conclusions are given in Section 5. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LIGHTWEIGHT MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION 
PROTOCOLS 
RFID tags compliant with EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (Gen-
2 in shorts) are based on transponders with limited functulities; 
e.g. 16-bit pseudo-random number generator (PRNG),  16-bit 
cyclic redundancy check code (CRC), and bitwise operations 
such as XOR, AND, and OR [11].  
Several protocols were proposed with the aim of securing 
Gen-2 tags. Unfortunately the majority of these protocols failed 
either to fulfill Gen-2 requirements or to satisfy the claimed 
security properties. For instance, [12] presented a protocol 
using a PIN password to secure the communication, however,  
it is shown to be volnurable to several attacks [13]   [14];  First, 
it is vulnerable to a de-synchronization attack as a consequence 
of the weak updating mechanism of the secret keys and the 
shared values. Secondly, it does not offer protection against 
replay attacks and a passive attacker can reuse tokens from 
Proceeding of International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Informatics (EECSI 2014), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20-21 August 2014
173
previous sessions. Thirdly, it is susceptible to a traceability 
attack since tags respond with the same value every time – in 
this last one, the attacker has to intercept the updating message 
and the tag would respond with a constant value.  
2.1. Yeh et al.’s Protocol 
This protocol was initially designed to overcome security 
weaknesses of a previous protocol proposed by Chien and 
Chen’s protocol [15]. In particular, the authors addressed DoS 
attacks, privacy concerns, and database computation overload.  
As its predecessor, the protocol avoids the usage of CRC 
functions due to its linearity. The tag stores Ki, Pi, Ci, EPCs and 
the database keeps copy of the Kold, Pold, Cold, Knew, Pnew, Cnew, 
RID, EPCs and DATA values, and finally the reader stores into 
its memory the reader identification, named as RID (see Fig.1 
for details). 
The protocol is divided into two phases: initialization phase 
and authentication phase.   
 
 
Initialization phase 
For each tag, the server randomly generates an initial 
authentication key (K0), initial access key (P0), and database 
index (C0). It sets these values for the records stored in the tag 
(i.e., Ki=K0, Pi=P0, Ci=C0) and the corresponding records 
stored on the database (i.e., Kold= K0, Knew=K0, Pold= P0, Pnew= 
P0, Cold=C0 and Cnew=C0). 
 
 (i + 1)
th
 authentication phase  
1. R Tagx: NR 
The reader generates a nonce NR and sends it to the tag as a 
challenge. Upon receiving NR, the tag generates another 
random number NT and uses both random values along with 
the values stored into its memory (Ki, Pi, Ci, EPCs) to compute 
the values (M1, D, Ci, E) using the following formulas: 
M1= PRNG(EPCSNR)Ki 
D = NTKi 
E = NTPRNG(CiKi) 
 
 Fig.1. Yeh et al’s Proposal 
 
2. Tag R: M1, D, Ci, E 
The tag forwards the values (M1, D, Ci, E) in one message 
to the reader. 
3. R  DB: V, M1, D, Ci, E, NR 
The reader computes value V using the formula 
V=H(RIDNR), then forwards it together with the contents of 
Message 1 (NR) and Message 2 (M1, D, Ci, E) to the database. 
Once received, the database performs the following operations: 
The database iteratively picks up each stored RID and 
computes H(RIDNR) for that record to authenticate the reader 
based on received value V. If a match is found, the reader will 
be authenticated and the procedure will continue. Otherwise, 
the session will be terminated. 
After the reader is authenticated, the database examines the 
value of Ci. If Ci=0, then this is a first time access. The 
database picks up every record sequentially, and computes 
three values (Iold, Inew, and PRNG(EPCS)NR) based on the 
received values M1, NR, and the stored ones (Kold, Knew, EPCS), 
where Iold= M1Kold and Inew=M1Knew. When a match  is 
found, where PRNG(EPCS)NR=Inew or 
PRNG(EPCS)NR=Iold, the database sets X as “new” for the 
first case, and “old” for the second case. Otherwise, if Ci< >0, 
then Ci is used as an index to look up the corresponding record 
in the database. The database checks the received value of Ci 
against the stored values for the corresponding record, where, 
if Ci=Cold then the database marks X in Kx as “old”. Contrarily, 
if Ci=Cnew, then the database marks X in Kx as “new”. The 
database subsequently recalculates M1 based on Kx value.    
The database uses the formula NT=DKX to retrieve the 
value of NT from the sub-message D. It then computes output 
value from the formula NTPRNG(CXKX) and compares this 
value with the sub-message E, which was received from the 
tag. If they do not match, the reader aborts the protocol and 
ends the session. Otherwise, the following applies: 
4. DB  R: M2, Info 
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The database computes the value of sub-message M2 using 
the formula M2=PRNG(EPCSNT)PX and the sub-message 
Info using the formula Info=(DATARID). Subsequently, it 
forwards these two values (M2, Info) to the reader. The 
database then updates the record’s values (Cold, Cnew, Kold, Knew, 
Pold, Pnew) based on the identified X’s value, where if X=old 
then Cnew=PRNG(NTNR) and the rest of the values remain 
unchanged. Otherwise, if X=new, then the record’s values 
labeled as new in the current session (Cnew, Knew, Pnew) becomes 
the old values for the next session (Cold, Kold, Pold) where 
Kold=Knew, Pold=Pnew, and Cold=Cnew. Values labeled as new are 
computed for the next session using the following formulas: 
Knew=PRNG(Knew), Pnew=PRNG(Pnew), and 
Cnew=PRNG(NTNR) 
When the reader receives the message, it obtains DATA 
from the info field by inversing the formula DATA=infoRID 
using the RID stored in it. After that, it forwards M2 to the tag. 
5. R Tag: M2 
When M2 is delivered, the tag computes PRNG(EPCSNT) 
from its data and computes M2Pi from the received M2 and 
stored Pi. If they are equal, its values must be updated by 
Ki+1=PRNG(Ki), Pi+1=PRNG(Pi) from its stored values of Ki 
and Pi, respectively, and Ci+1=PRNG(NTNR) by the NR it 
received from the reader and NT it generated at the beginning 
of the session. It then concludes the session. Otherwise, the 
protocol is aborted and old values are preserved. 
 
 
3. VULNERABILITY OF YEH ET AL.’S PROTOCOL 
In this paper we present a de-synchronization and 
impersonation attacks against Yeh et al.’s protocol.  These 
attacks complement the ones (integrity and forward security 
problems) presented in [16].  
 
3.1. De-synchronization attack 
Yeh et al.’s protocol was designed using two sets of 
authentication and access keys to combat DoS attack, which 
causes a de-synchronization state between the tag and the 
server. The authors criticized the fact that its predecessor 
scheme (i.e., Chien and Chen’s protocol [15]) updated the key 
values (Kold and Pold) on every successful mutual authentication 
session at the database side.  Motivated by this, Yeh et al. 
proposed to add a validation criterion for this updating 
mechanism to solve the de-synchronization attack, which 
Chien and Chen’s protocol suffers from, and is based on the 
usage of the new values D, E, and Ci. Nevertheless, despite 
these validation tokens, we show how replay attacks can de-
synchronize the protocol. The used adversary (malicious 
reader) has to be able to interrupt and forward messages only, 
and it does not need to have the capability to communicate 
with the database. This adversary will execute two session 
procedures in one session. That is, both communication 
sessions are executed almost in parallel but with only a slight 
difference in time:  
In the (i+1)
th
 authentication session, the malicious reader 
will intercept the last message from the database and throw 
away M2 message to keep the tag using the same index value 
Ci+1. At the same time, the database will update its local 
parameters, specifically Cold would be Cnew, and Ci+1, and its 
Cnew would be Ci+2. 
In a slightly posterior session (almost a parallel session), 
the malicious reader will resend a new Message 3. However, 
instead of containing (V, M1, D, Ci, E, NR), it will send (V, 
M1, DRND, Ci, ERND, NR), which will allow the database 
to understand that it is a new session. These values (i.e., V, M1, 
DRND, Ci, ERND, NR) will facilitate the tag to be 
authenticated by the database because NR continues to 
represent the same values from the eavesdropped session. NT 
will become NTRND, which is used correctly   in D and E 
messages. Due to modified Message 3 sent by the reader, the 
database will update its Cnew value based on the Cx (in this 
case, X=old) from Ci+2 to Ci+3. At the same time, the malicious 
reader will forward the stored M2 message to the tag, causing 
the tag to update its values from (Ki+1, Pi+1 and Ci+1) to (Ki+2, 
Pi+2 and Ci+2).  
At this step the tag will store Ci+2 as index value, and the 
database will keep the values Ci+1 and Ci+3.   Therefore, the tag 
and the database lost its synchronization and this is permanent. 
In fact, the tag can never be identified because the search index 
stored into its memory is different from the two index (old and 
new) values stored in the database. 
 
3.2. Impersonation attack 
In this section, we introduce tag impersonation attack 
conducted by a dishonest reader. The key points of this attack 
are based on the use of NT nonce in both D and E tokens and 
the abusive use of the bitwise XOR operations.  Bitwise 
operations like XOR are linear functions, which are vulnerable 
to active and passive attacks. The proposed attack is sketched 
below:  
 
(i + 1)
th
 authentication phase  
 
(1) R    Tagx: NR 
(2) Tag  R: M1, D, Ci, E 
 M1= PRNG (EPCSNR)Ki 
 D = NTKi 
 E = NTPRNG(CiKi) 
(3) R   DB: V, M1, D, Ci, E, NR 
(4) DB  R: M2, Info 
(5) R   Tagx: Attack 
 
The attack can be performed using two methods.   First   by 
preventing the reader from forwarding any messages to the tag. 
Alternatively, the adversary can interrupt the last message and 
send a fraudulent message containing an incorrect value of M2. 
Proceeding of International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Informatics (EECSI 2014), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20-21 August 2014
175
At this point, the targeted tag is isolated and the malicious 
reader can replace and impersonate the original tag by 
computing simple bitwise XOR operations as described in the 
following.  
- (i + n)
th
 authentication phase (n>2) 
Basically the fraudulent reader simulates that the tag 
always incorrectly receives the message M2. Therefore, the 
updating phase is not run in the tag and previous M1 message 
is valid.  
In detail, M1, D, E, NR, and V are the picked values of a 
previous legitimate session.   After the reception of M2, the 
reader block this message and simulates the tag incorrectly 
received M2. After that, the fraudulent reader sends M1, 
DRND, ERND, NR, V, where RND represents an 
arbitrary random value. The tag is authenticated since M1 is 
legitimate. The random number NT' associated to this session 
is the bitwise XOR between NT and RND. We sketch the 
process below:   
DBR: M2, Info Fake R DB: M1, DRND, 
ERND, NR, V 
The proposed attack can be executed indefinitely as the 
original scheme does not assume any threshold for the number 
of times the M2 message can be interrupted, altered, or 
incorrectly received. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We scrutinize the security of Yeh et al.’s protocol for RFID 
Gen-2 tags. The security properties claimed by the authors in 
the original protocol have been refuted by proposing attacks 
against the authentication scheme.  We show how the protocol 
is vulnerable against de-synchronization and impersonation 
attacks.  The attacks can be conducted by a malicious reader, 
which mainly forwards message and does simple modifications 
exploiting the weaknesses of the bitwise XOR operations.  
Complementary to the attacks presented in this paper, in [16] 
Yoon showed how the scheme suffers from integrity and 
forward secrecy problems.    
The design of secure RFID authentication protocols 
compliant with Gen2 standard is still an open-challenge.  New 
proposals have to be presented together with a rigorous 
security analysis to avoid such   trivial security pitfalls.  
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Kim, M., et al., Forward-backward analysis of RFID-enabled supply 
chain using fuzzy cognitive map and genetic algorithm. Expert Systems 
with Applications, 2008. 35(3): p. 1166-1176. 
[2] Sun, Q., H. Zhang, and L. Mo, Dual reader wireless protocols for dense 
active RFID identification. International Journal of Communication 
Systems, 2011. 24(11): p. 1431-1444. 
[3] Cho, K., et al., An extensible and ubiquitous RFID management 
framework over next generation network. International Journal of 
Communication Systems, 2009. 23(910): p. 1093-1110. 
[4] Kim, S.C., J.S. Cho, and S.K. Kim, Performance improvement of hybrid 
tag anti collision protocol for radio frequency identification systems. 
International Journal of Communication Systems, 2012. 
[5] Weis, S., et al., Security and privacy aspects of low-cost radio frequency 
identification systems. Security in Pervasive Computing, 2004: p. 50-59. 
[6] Juels, A., RFID security and privacy: A research survey. IEEE Journal 
on Selected Areas in Communications, 2006. 24(2): p. 381-394. 
[7] Lim, C. and T. Korkishko, mCryptontion A lightweight block cipher for 
security of low-cost RFID tags and Sensors. Information Security 
Applications, 2006: p. 243-258. 
[8] Li, J.S. and K.H. Liu, A hidden mutual authentication protocol for low 
cost RFID tags. International Journal of Communication Systems, 2011. 
24(9): p. 1196-1211. 
[9] Yeh, T., et al., Securing RFID systems conforming to EPC Class 1 
Generation 2 standard Expert System With Application 2010. 37(4): p. 
7678-7683. 
[10] Chien, H., SASI: A new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol 
providing strong authentication and strong integrity. IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2007. 4(4): p. 337-340. 
[11] EPCglobal. Class 1 Generation 2 UHF Air Interface Protocol Standard 
"Gen 2" Version 1.2.0.  2008  [cited 2010 15th October]; Available 
from: http://www.epcglobalinc.org/standards/. 
[12] Chien, H., SASI: A new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol 
providing strong authentication and strong integrity. IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2007. 4(4): p. 337-340. 
[13] Duc, D., et al. Enhancing security of EPCglobal Gen-2 RFID tag against 
traceability and cloning. in The Symposium on Cryptography and 
Information Security, 2006. 2006: Citeseer. 
[14] Sun, H.-M., W.-C. Ting, and K.-H. Wang, On the  Security of Chien's 
Ultra-Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol. IEEE Transactions on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, 2009. 99. 
[15] Chien, H.Y. and C.W. Huang, Security of ultra-lightweight RFID 
authentication protocols and its improvements. ACM SIGOPS 
Operating Systems Review, 2007. 41(4): p. 86. 
[16] Chien, H. Y. and Chen, C. H. Mutual authentication protocol for RFID 
conforming to EPC class 1 generation 2 standards. Computer Standards 
and Interfaces, 2207. 29: p. 254-259.  
[17] Yoon, E.J. Improvement of the Security systems conforming to EPC 
Class 1 Generation 2 standard. Expert Systems and Applications, 2012. 
39: p. 1589-1595.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proceeding of International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Informatics (EECSI 2014), Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 20-21 August 2014
176
